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speakers moved (along with a comic lexicon of abuse) from drama to oratory,
surfacing also in the Platonic dialogue (although ignored for the most part
by Aristotle) and proliferating in Theophrastus. Although for the sake of
clarity I have focused in this review on the central opposition between the
aggressive versus and the weak and decadent speaker, W. is clear that these
two types exist at opposite ends of a continuum and that characteristics
of one type can slide into another. Particularly welcome is her insistence
that the iambic mode transcends genre. This enables her to make wide-
ranging and successful connections between comedy, satyr play, tragedy,
philosophy, and forensic rhetoric. One of the pleasures of the book is to
trace the various instantiations of the paradoxical figure of Socrates from
Aristophanes to Plato and Theophrastus. Socrates does not occur explicitly
in the last of these, but the cumulative force of W.’s analysis compels the
reader to give serious consideration to her suggestion that he is a shadowy
presence in several of Theophrastus’ caricatures, the product of “a tradition
of characterization that wittily assimilates to intemperate types a teacher
who used his famous recalcitrance to disparage and tease haughty, boastful
elites” (317). Individual readers will, of course, find places where they could
desire reformulation or areas where further questions arise. I, for example,
am not entirely comfortable with the contention (22) that Plato adopted the
language of insult from dramatic genres—this seems to me to be perhaps an
overly reductive way of formulating a process that was surely more complex.
This leads in turn to problems about how informal practices of insult bleed
into and from the rhetoricized versions we find in our literary texts (a reading
of the treatment of invective found in Plato’s Laws 934-936 would be useful
here). Yet it is no insult to suggest that the book presents opportunities for
future reflection; some discomfort is a small price to pay for such thoughtful
and productive work.
Kathryn A. Morgan
University of California at Los Angeles
Sergey Dolgopolski. What is Talmud? The Art of Disagreement. New
York: Fordham University Press, 2009. xii + 333 pp.
ISBN: 9780823229345
This book joins an increasing body of work devoted to the study of
Jewish discourse. The study of Jewish rhetoric has found a place in the
work of rhetoric and composition scholars who are turning their attention
to the subject of non-Western or alternative rhetorics (Carol Lipson and
Roberta Binkley’s Ancient Non-Greek Rhetorics), as well as scholars who
imagine that the conceptual integrity of the notion “Jewish perspectives”
can be coherently expressed as a book (Andrea Greenbaum and Deborah
Holstein’s Jewish Perspectives in Rhetoric and Composition). What is Talmud?
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also shares a concern with work in Jewish studies devoted to pedagogy
(Simcha Assaf), rabbinic literary activity (Daniel Boyarin, Jeffrey Rubenstein,
David Stern), historiography (Ismar Schorsch), systematic Hebrew rhetorics
(Isaac Rabinowitz, Arthur Lesley) and the hermeneutical activity of text-
based communities (Moshe Halbertal).
While there are resources enough from which to construct a course on
“Jewish discourse,” the idea of teaching and studying “Jewish rhetorics” is
still problematic inasmuch as there is a sense that organizing the considerable
scholarly activity devoted to “Jewish discourse” under the phrase “Jewish
rhetorics” is at best an anachronistic projection and, at worst, an act of
violent appropriation. One way to avoid the charges of appropriation or
anachronism would be to treat “rhetoric” as a set of methodologies that
could be productively applied to any “text.” The problem with this approach
is that often the methodologies that fall under the heading of rhetoric were
produced in support of philosophical or historical investigations. For this
reason, others have chosen to treat rhetoric as a set of concerns, or even
a predisposition to ask certain kinds of questions. The idea of “Jewish
rhetorics” might, in that instance as well, avoid the violence of appropriation,
but “rhetoric,” then runs the risk of simply being another name for something
that is being productively and more accurately examined as “discourse” or
“literary activity.” The concept of “Jewish rhetorics” may encounter some
resistance because, in avoiding the charges of anachronism or violence,
“Jewish rhetorics” promise that they will say nothing new.
While rhetoric’s ontological worries will be familiar territory for Rhetor-
ica’s readership, it is important to keep them in mind as Dolgopolski’s work
positions itself in and between the fields of Jewish studies and rhetoric. As
the title of this volume suggests, Dolgopolski’s project is to work through
the question, “What is Talmud?” This is the question that Dogopolski finds
in the work and the practices represented by R.I. Canpanton’s The Ways of
the Talmud, a fifteenth-century work that directly affected Talmudic learning
for the next two centuries. It is important to note that the question “What
is Talmud?” is not treated as the opposite of those inquiries/projects asso-
ciated with the question “What is the Talmud?” Dolgopolski does makes the
claim that “What is Talmud?” is a more fundamental question than “What
is the Talmud?” because the former question opens up a discussion whose
raison d’eˆtre is the expression of something new. Here, Dolgopolski runs the
risk of evoking criticism. There would be no problem if he were simply to
make the case that Canpanton’s The Ways of Talmud should be revisited and
appreciated through the application of concepts drawn from continental phi-
losophy (namely Derrida and Deleuze). Dolgopolski’s study would simply
be another way of giving presence to the Talmud, as a book, leaving intact
the Being of the book and the kind of histories that support it.
To be sure, Dolgopolski’s study provides both an angle of appreciation
for Canpanton’s The Ways of Talmud as well as an addition to the discussion of
the relationship between philosophy and rhetoric as seen from the position
of Talmud. Taking Derrida’s critiques of Heidegger as his starting point,
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Dolgopolski asks us to consider that there must be a “nonphilosophical yet
metaphysical side of the Talmud” (23), and that there are ways that “the
Talmud may be rhetorical, not philosophical, and yet metaphysical” (24).
After all, sages (the actors on the Talmudic stage) share with the philosopher
a desire for the truth as well as a certain suspicion regarding the ideas
and opinions offered by their students. But, unlike philosophers–at least the
Platonic kind–the sages must also acknowledge the authority of a tradition.
And, unlike rhetoricians, sages are not fixed on the actual or potential “here
and now” of their audiences.
A sage’s acquisition of knowledge and their ability to transmit that
knowledge requires that they know how the tradition can be true. Can-
panton could have responded to the question of the tradition’s validity by
simply inviting the tradition to stand before the court of reason. He could
have treated logic as a tool for all that falls under the categories of exegesis
and deduction. But Canpanton chooses another path by requiring that his
students treat all Talmudic discussions as valid; his students are then put in
the position to test the truth of their “reasoning” with the text by seeking out
the “novelty” in their plain understanding of the Talmudic oration or the nov-
elty in their understanding of the “exaction” of the text. This pedagogical
choice reflects Canpanton’s understanding of the nature of Talmudic dis-
agreement. Exaction is a kind of deduction which is supported/prompted
by the necessity that there is a compelling reason for any statement to be
made. Canpanton assumes that no authentic (“reasonable,” logically valid)
disagreement could simply be explained away by identifying differences
in the historical or psychological scene or agents in whose name the dis-
agreement is expressed. Dolgopolski develops this point further by showing
how “disagreement” did not take place historically in a past made present in
history but in a “radical past,” a past that has never been present (84).
What is Talmud? is particularly strong in terms of its presentation of
Canpanton’s methods of study, the specific tasks assigned to his students,
and how a “radical past” is encountered by way of these methods of study.
In addition, chapter five provides an analytical exposition of the theoretical
parts of The Ways of the Talmud, which will make Canpanton’s work accessible
to Anglophone readers. Dolgopolski’s study might then and should be
welcomed as an informed and highly suggestive discussion of Canpanton’s
working of the Talmud.
That being said, What is Talmud? would also ask us to see the following
in this particular acceptance of his work: that the status of the Talmud is
unchanged, and perhaps we, as readers and students, are unchanged as well;
that the goal of our discourse of acceptance is agreement. Once we recognize
that, then we might be more open to consider how the question “What is
Talmud?” promises to offer an alternative to the discourse of acceptance and
agreement. What is Talmud? is a way to situate the study of “Jewish rhetorics”
by offering a place not in the diversity of others (perspectives, cultures, etc.)
but in the differences expressed by us (rhetoricians) when we speak as others
(historians, philosophers, Talmudists).
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Disagreements are often treated as differing appearances or perspectives
on a singular reality (after Perelman and Obrechts-Tyteka, for example) or
as prompts for the invention of an agreement or unity to come. However,
building on Canpanton’s example, Dolgopolski’s work develops a sustained
and insightful construction of what might be termed Talmudic rationalism
where the ontological entailments of expressions are drawn from the careful
and charitable articulation of disagreements. As such, What is Talmud? is an
important new contribution to the study of rhetoric. In addition, What is
Talmud? is a necessary reorientation and elaboration on current studies of
Rabbinic discourse and textuality, which has been dominated by praise for
Rabbinic tolerance and appreciation of polysemy. What is Talmud? puts on the
table the possibility that in accepting the Talmud as the historical anchor (if
not the core symbol) for an appreciation of polysemy and multiple truths, we
have done so at the expense of Talmudic understandings of disagreement.
David Metzger
Old Dominion University (Norfolk, Virginia)
David M. Timmerman and Edward Schiappa. Classical Greek Rhetor-
ical Theory and the Disciplining of Discourse. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010. 192 pp. ISBN 9780521195188
Traditional accounts of rhetoric’s emergence in fifth-century Greece have
encountered many recent challenges and revisions. Among these challenges,
Edward Schiappa’s prolific scholarship on classical rhetoric has always been
exceptional. In this vein, Schiappa has long argued for the importance of a
later origin of rhetoric as a distinct discipline than has been presumed. It
arose as a discipline, that is – something that could be studied – he says, in
the fourth-century in the wake of Plato’s invention of the term rhetorike. This
latest volume, coauthored with David Timmerman, continues to provoke the
reader to question accepted rhetorical histories and is located well within the
scholarly trajectory of Schiappa’s earlier work, in particular, the Beginnings of
Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).
However, by emphasizing the role of “terms of art,” Classical Greek Rhetorical
Theory and the Disciplining of Discourse adds a refined focus on discourse in
the formation of rhetoric as a discipline.
Timmerman and Schiappa explain “terms of art” as bits and pieces of
disciplinary jargon that have “specialized denotative functions” (p.1) for
those within a distinct knowledge community. Their introductory chapter
provides a nuanced theoretical and historical explanation of such terms in the
context of the history of rhetoric. The authors contend that the emergence
of this kind of technical vocabulary is evidence of the expansion of the
available “semantic field” and of corresponding “conceptual possibilities”
(p. 6) available to rhetorical practitioners. Terms of art, in this way, are a
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